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Nationalism, the Mob, and Left Dreams 
Malcolm James and Sivamohan Valluvan 
 
 
At the recent Tory Conference, Party Chairman James Cleverly ominously 
warned that civil unrest awaited Britain should Brexit be frustrated. Setting 
in train a shift in Britain’s post-war political settlement, a mob was being 




But lest this be read as simply another unanticipated symptom of a 
purportedly ‘polarized’ and ‘extreme’ present, Cleverly’s politics has in fact 
been many decades in the making. Forty years ago, Britain was experiencing 
a structural crisis of capitalism. That crisis was rooted in a declining 
manufacturing base, diminished technological competitiveness, a weakened 
global trade position, and deepening regional inequalities. And it was out of 
the stagnation of this era-defining crisis that ‘Thatcherism’, as coined by the 
late Stuart Hall, was able to forge its infamous campaign of pro-market 
transformations.  
 
This was a transformation whose ‘common sense’ purchase was not only 
sourced in the purported virtues of capitalist merit, but was also tied to a 
populist-nationalism characterised by an authoritarian appeal to ‘law and 
order’ and its attendant logics of national identity. This was, in other words, 
a political project that traded on an aggressive modelling of the normative 
national subject – white, petite-bourgeois and provincial – and the threats 
allegedly posed to it by, amongst other things, Black youth, immigrants 
‘swamping’ the realm, unions, and the IRA. 
 
The broader ideologies of deviance through which Britain had legitimated 
its rule in the colonies, through which Eurocentric modernity had mapped 
its racial Others, through which nationalists (of different ideological 
formations) had railed against outsiders, and through which the Edwardian 
establishment had distinguished the working classes, provided a deep 
archive for this populist theatre. However, as Hall again took great care to 
explain, this is not to say that Thatcher’s Tories did not have an electoral 
base that remained confident about the aggressively pro-market projects 
being introduced. On the contrary, while the Tories worked hard to split the 
working class, as well as leveraging the spectre of the outsider to optimal 
electoral effect, they also located their project in the capitalism of the high 
street. In short, their market evangelism depended electorally on the 
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proverbial ‘Little Englander’ imagining an economic stake in a more 




For Thatcher and her immediate successors, a symbolism of British business 
was part and parcel of the nationalist project. Today however, the Tory 
party is not remotely connected to the high street; its economic affinities are 
instead more firmly aligned to a small smattering of opaque hedge funds, as 
Boris Johnson’s campaign war chest attests. As this Conservative Party 
becomes further disconnected from the populist mandate of ‘British 
business’, it is the debris of Thatcherism’s authoritarian nation-craft that it 
reaches for. Alongside the comments of James Cleverly, consider Boris 
Johnson’s use of the police as a prop in Wakefield, Michael Gove’s 
comments on flouting the Supreme Court ruling, Rees-Mogg’s 
contemptuous repose in parliament, and even just the ‘fuck business’ 
rhetoric that is now being wielded to great populist effect by Tory grandees. 
All of which are gestures that begin to signal a political leadership intent on 
circumventing the inconveniences of democracy rather than playing to its 
legitimacy. In short, Boris Johnson and his team seem to be previewing a 
nationalist repertoire of authoritarian rule by attacking key markers of 
democracy – particularly parliament and the judiciary, but even, it seems, 
many of the stakeholders of British enterprise itself. 
 
No longer able to speak credibly for high-street capitalist uplift, today’s right 
has little but nationalist ‘resentment’ with which to cohere its public. The 
degraded symbols of parliament, the judiciary and even business itself then 
join an ever-growing chain of demons against which a nationalist grievance 
can be asserted: racialised Others, migrant outsiders, EU mandarins, Greta 
Thunberg, feminism, Jewish philanthropists, the Pope, and even just general 
geographies (e.g. the much-loathed ‘North London’ and those other hubs 
where ‘metropolitan’ matcha-drinking ‘liberals’ are said to congregate). 
 
This entrenchment helps explain the recourse of today’s Tories to the 
frenzied language of ‘betrayal’. Boris Johnson’s use of terms like ‘surrender 
bill’ has received considerable critical attention but less has been noted has 
about the deep psychic wounds such language excites in the nation. Like 
Johnson’s ongoing Winston Churchill pastiche, the longing evoked here 
belongs to what Paul Gilroy refers to as Britain’s ‘postcolonial melancholia’. 
The language of war and ‘do or die’ brinkmanship recalls the nation-making 
lore of the Second World War, and a mournful (if impossible) desire to 
relive the buccaneering glories of Britannia and/or just a lost rustic idyll 
suffused by the moral clarity of white English homogeneity.  
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As Fintan O’Toole makes apparent, it is the very impossibility of this 
recourse to glorious ‘sovereignty’ that further hardens the play to all things 
parochial and chauvinistic. Namely, we find ourselves amidst a toxic 
paradox where national affirmation, illusory as it is, can only happen 
through an ever-hardening aversion towards the ‘outside’ and those who do 
not belong. This is an appeal to the national collective less as ‘people’ and 
more as ‘mob’; a politics of negation that is fed only by more negation.  
 
We see, in sum, the full usurping of the Tory right by the nationalist 
imperative, leaving the party’s other 20th century commitments in tatters. 
Their fabled notions of prudent pragmatism, the family business, and even 
purportedly liberal freedoms all expire when a ‘disaster nationalism’, and the 




Liberal resistance has unsurprisingly relied on an appeal to law, procedure 
and constitutionalism; the Supreme Court victory of Gina Miller against the 
proroguing of parliament being particularly prominent here. This response is 
understandable, even creditable. But it does also rely on a form of political 
intervention that vacates the popular by focusing attentions on institutional 
procedure. In turn, it leaves uncontested the broader appeal of authoritarian 
nationalism, and more problematically, distracts from a popular left-led 
opposition and renewal.  
 
Those who suppose that such a renewal is to be more easily found in a 
return to centrist moderation should remember that it was precisely the 
putative centrism of the Blair-Cameron pivot that rehearsed the belligerent 
nationalist assertion we are living today. The hectoring about inadequate 
integration, the Islamophobia of the war-on-terror and its security logics, 
and the unwillingness to defend immigration, multiculturalism and even just 
the idea of Europe were all nurtured here. The gilded frame of ‘reasonable 
moderation’ is thoroughly tarnished in that light.  
 
The hope of renewal through left nationalism fares worse still. The 
recycling of assorted nativist canards, particularly through the neologism of 
‘white working class’, is little more than an appeal to white authenticity and 
entitlement. As we have written elsewhere, such a project betrays any 
commitment to the actual material, socioeconomic interests of the working 
class as well as bankrupting the left’s anti-racist credentials. Furthermore, 
the left cannot even move forward on these terms, as the right will always 
have greater political claim to such terrain. As Malik has argued, the left 
becomes only a witless ‘handmaiden’ in such a scenario. 
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Mette Frederiksen, Leader of the Social Democrats in Denmark, is a case in 
point. Frederiksen’s loud seconding of highly controversial anti-immigration 
initiatives and so-called ‘ghetto laws’ paved her way to the premiership. But 
in so doing she has given succor to an intensified nationalism, proving again 
that nationalist positions cannot be parlayed for opportunist purposes.  
 
As Frederiksen shows, the helmspeople of nationalist electoral ‘stunts’ 
become obliged to unleash and/or intensify a state programme 
commensurate to that nationalism and its often racialised politics of loss, 
grievance and fear. The call of nationalism is never just the benign show of 
patriotic solidarity that some wish it to be; but instead, it constitutes a non-
negotiable commitment to delivering the aforementioned ‘negation’. In 
short, left stewardship of nationalism will only deepen the problems of this 
moment, rather than resolving them.  
 
We accordingly contend that, instead of raiding nationalism in pursuit of a 
hollow political legitimacy, the left will find better clues for its programme 
of renewal in the form of the crisis itself. After all, one of the things the 
‘clamour for nationalism’ does also ably signal is an appetite for a politics of 
ambition bigger than the inhibited technocracies of the 1990s/2000s. This is 
not to say that today’s nationalism is simply an anti-capitalism that can be 
redirected. It is instead to note that an alternative attempt at decidedly 
adventurous renewal might also have some success if ventured.  
 
The story of authoritarian nationalism we have sketched here is certainly 
sobering, but these are not the only horizons the present carries. We still live 
with the residues of powerful alternative modernisms. Welfarism, 
redistribution, anti-colonialism and civil rights struggle are still motifs that 
captivate. And entrenched in everyday life are forms of social and emotional 
care and an array of mutualisms that can still forcefully challenge the politics 
of closure. For instance, our multiethnic cities are comprised of social 
practices that refuse exclusionary politics (even if such exclusionary claims 
do of course persist here too in significant ways). There is also an emergent 
left politics being cohered around radical climate consciousness and a 
planetary sense of mutual responsibility (as opposed to perpetual 
extraction).  This is a politics that has significant potential and represents a 
terrain on which the right cannot easily win. 
 
Many of these energies are being currently revived by the millennials of the 
Corbyn left, and it remains frustrating that they are being met only with 
lukewarm reserve. And yes, while electorally their policies are unlikely to 
meet instant success, it is part of a longer staking of a popular left politics 
that is equal to the historical scale that is required.  
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Needless to say, such a politics should acknowledge, as a matter of first 
principle, the need for a coherent anti-nationalist formation. The 
increasingly confident drift towards authoritarian nationalism represents a 
world-historical move that privileges the command style of state capitalism, 
strong-man charisma, and sustained assaults, both real and symbolic, on 
minorities, migrants, borders, environmentalists, and other sites of dissent. 
These are the governmental closures being rehearsed the world over. 
Nothing less than the embedding of an alternative collectivist programme 
imagined outside of the myopia of communitarian chauvinism will be 
required to stem this tide.  
